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I. INTRODUCTION
The law does not require that an attorney be infallible and simply because
an attorney has made a mistake does not establish negligence or malprac-

tice as a matter of law.1
* Shareholder in the firm of Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney, P.A. in Columbia, South
Carolina; B.A. with distinction, Converse College; J.D. cum laude, University ofSouth Carolina.
** Shareholder in the firm of Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney, P.A. in Columbia, South
Carolina; B.S., University of South Carolina; J.D. magna cum laude, University of South
Carolina.
*** Associate in the firm of Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney, P.A. in Columbia, South
Carolina; B.S., University of South Carolina; J.D., University of South Carolina.
1. Cianbro Corp. v. Jeffcoat& Martin, 804 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.S.C. 1992) (citing Myers
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"Accountability" is today's buzzword. Not many years ago, attorneys
rarely faced malpractice claims. Disgruntled clients have, perhaps, always
been with us, but in an era in which accountability is increasingly expected
and demanded, those clients are now more likely to pursue claims and lawsuits
against their attorneys - regardless of whether the attorneys' errors are real
or only imagined by the clients. Accordingly, the number of lawsuits against
attorneys has proliferated.
The increase in legal malpractice claims stems from the nature of our
adversary system and the public's increased propensity towards litigation.
Clients are result-oriented, and an attorney's unsuccessful efforts on behalf of
a client can easily form, at least in the client's mind, the basis for a malpractice claim.' As lawyering has become increasingly complex, it has also
become a business. 3 The shelter of the ivory law tower has been greatly
diminished, in part because attorneys are no longer reluctant to sue fellow
attorneys. 4 In addition, the increased reliance on professional malpractice
insurance has unquestionably provided a deep pocket for plaintiffs' attorneys
to target. 5
This article is not a risk management guide 6 or an attempt at a grand
academic analysis of all legal malpractice issues. 7 Instead, this article focuses
specifically on the defenses to a legal malpractice claim, with attention to
various practical aspects of preparing a legal malpractice defense. This article
addresses some pitfalls unique to defending legal malpractice claims and
suggests some strategies for handling problems that may arise. Finally, the
article discusses the propriety and usefulness of slap back suits and counterclaims.

v. Beem, 712 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985)), aff'd, 10 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 1993)

(table).
2. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, MALPRACTICE AND THE LAWYER 1, 1 (1981) ("[Cllient's
tend to judge a lawyer's effectiveness solely by the results which he produces. .. ").
3. See Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Professionto a Business, 41 VAND. L. REV. 741
(1988); Duncan A. MacDonald, Speculations by a Customer About the Future of Large Law
Firms, 64 IND. L.J. 593 (1989).
4. See KiNDREGAN, supra note 2, at 2 ("If a conspiracy of silence ever existed in the legal
profession it may be dying as more lawyers are willing to file complaints or even testify against
other attorneys."); see also Paul D. Rheingold, Legal Malpractice:Plaintiff'sStrategies, LrrzO.,
Winter 1989, at 13, 13 (stating that the author has not been ostracized or inhibited despite an
active practice representing plaintiffs in legal malpractice actions).
5. See KINDREGAN, supra note 2, at 2.
6. E.g., Duke N. Stem, Reducing Your MalpracticeRisk, A.B.A.J., June 1, 1986, at 52.
7. E.g., RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMrrH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (3d ed. 1989 &
Supp. 1993) [hereinafter MALLEN & SMITH].
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I.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND PITFALLS

Defending a legal malpractice claim is similar to defending other civil
actions.
However, perhaps more than others, it requires a thorough
knowledge and understanding of both the defendant-attorney and the
underlying case or transaction at issue in the malpractice suit.
The defendant-attorney feels threatened by the potential loss of professional reputation and livelihood, much like a physician or other professional sued
for malpractice. Even if the attorney has adequate malpractice insurance that
covers each allegation asserted in the complaint, which is by no means
assured, the attorney still has a great personal and business interest in clearing
his name. The defendant-attorney, who is trained in the legal process and
possibly an experienced litigator, 8 is suddenly seated on the wrong side of the
desk, relegated to the role of litigant rather than counsel and generally forced
to rely on the skills and dedication of a defense counsel who was probably
selected by the malpractice insurance carrier. In short, the defendant-attorney
may find it difficult to achieve and maintain the level of detachment required
to allow defense counsel to maximally defend the malpractice claim.
Furthermore, the defendant-attorney may make a poor witness due to
strictly external factors. As evidenced by the current wave of "lawyer
bashing," attorneys may not be held in high regard by the jury pool.9 On the
other hand, because of lawyers' educational background and legal experience,
a jury may expect the defendant-attorney to be at ease in the witness chair and
in full command of the details and nuances of all questions asked. Both juries
and judges are likely to hold the defendant-attorney to a higher standard than
witnesses with no legal training or experience. These expectations, combined
with the public's perceived aversion to lawyers, may place the defendant-

8. A 1983-85 American Bar Association survey found that the largest percentage of
malpractice claims (25.1%) were asserted against plaintiff personal injury attorneys. A.B.A.
STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, THE LAWYER'S DESK GUIDE TO

LEGAL MALPRACTICE 30 (1992). The same study revealed that litigation activities accounted for
52.8% of all malpractice claims. Id. at 23.
9. See, e.g., Richard D. Bridgman, Legal Malpractice - A Considerationof the Elements
of a Strong Plaintiff'sCase, 30 S.C. L. REV. 213, 214 (1979) (jesting that "It]he lawyer...
enjoy[s] community stature somewhere between that of an automobile salesman and an
undertaker") (citation omitted).
The English romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge wrote:
He saw a lawyer killing a Viper
On a dunghill hard by his own stable;
And the Devil smiled, for it put him in mind
Of Cain and his brother, Abel.
SAMUEL T. COLERIDGE, The Devil's Thoughts, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF SAMUEL
TAYLOR COLERIDGE 320 (1912) (quoted in James D. Gordon III, How Not to Succeed in Law
School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679, 1679-80 (1991)).
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attorney at a disadvantage before even taking the witness stand."0
Further complicating matters, the defendant-attorney may possess a
variety of personality or behavioral traits that may help the attorney in his
practice, but become an obstacle to the attorney's successful performance as
a witness. For instance, an attorney who is gifted and skilled at mastering an
array of details and strategies in the practice of law may also have difficulty
describing the transaction at issue in terms that a juror can understand.
Fostered by years of being the person in control and having the knowledge
others pay large sums to tap, the defendant-attorney may have a tendency to
assume that he knows the answer to all questions. Likewise, the attorney may
be prone to violate the cardinal rule of witness testimony by answering a
question that has not yet been asked, due to the attorney's overabundance real or imagined - of knowledge. 1 The challenge for the attorney's defense
counsel is to transform the defendant-attorney from an overly confident and
potentially abrasive witness into a confident witness worthy of the jury's trust,
without losing any of the substance of the attorney's testimony.
In addition to a thorough understanding and ability to deal with the
defendant-attorney, defense counsel must also master the defendant-attorney's
area of legal practice in question in the malpractice suit. As litigators, defense
counsel are accustomed to becoming experts, in a short period of time, on
very narrow issues of an unfamiliar topic. For example, defense attorneys
litigate construction defects, valuations of property or businesses, the causes
of low back pain, and a variety of other topics in which they have absolutely
no background or training. Through independent research and instruction
from their clients and witnesses, however, they master the necessary
information and use it to their clients' advantage.
Defending a legal malpractice case may require a litigator to go even
further. The practice of law routinely involves the application of subjective
and reasoned legal judgment to a set of facts. Defense counsel must
understand not only the underlying transaction or case, 2 but also the
strategies, assumptions, and goals that both the defendant-attorney and the
plaintiff-client considered. This may be relatively easy for defense counsel to
accomplish when the underlying case involved the conduct and presentation of
a trial. However, when the underlying case involves the application of legal
judgment to an unfamiliar area of practice, the defense counsel may need
assistance from the defendant-attorney and expert witnesses. For example, the
legal documents governing a business transaction may have been influenced

10. One commentator refers to this as "a lion's den of high expectation and low regard."
Jeffrey M. Smith, Defending Lawyers'Mistakes, LrriG., Winter 1989, at 18, 56.

11. See id.
12. The underlying transaction or case is often referred to as the "case within the case." E.g.,
Bridgman, supra note 9, at 234.
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by timing decisions, relative negotiating positions, economic conditions and
projections, and regulatory limitations or requirements. After the deal goes
sour, the successful defense of an attorney charged with malpractice in the
drafting of the documents may depend on the defense counsel's ability to
understand and present the effect of those considerations on the attorney's
preparation of the document, as well as the effect of those factors on the
transaction as a whole. Getting inside the minds of both the attorney and the
client at the time of the transaction or the trial in order to evaluate their
motives and goals can be of crucial importance.
A problem unique to legal malpractice defense occurs when an ethics
complaint is filed with the applicable disciplinary authority. Because no
damages are sought in a disciplinary procedure, the defendant-attorney's
insurance may not provide coverage or a defense. This may result in the need
for two defense attorneys: one furnished by the insurance carrier to defend the
malpractice case, and the other hired by the defendant-attorney to defend the
alleged ethical violation. The two defense attorneys may take inconsistent
positions or unintentionally interfere with each other's strategy.
One
commentator advocates seeking a stay of the disciplinary proceedings to avoid
a collateral estoppel argument in the event of an adverse ruling.13 A stay
would also eliminate the dual representation problem.
III. DEFENSES TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. General Denial
In most cases, the defendant-attorney's answer will contain a general
denial of the plaintiff's allegations of legal malpractice. "Legal malpractice"
is not easily defined, because claims against attorneys may be brought under
several different theories. 14 "However, a key test for legal malpractice is
whether a claim primarily concerns the quality of legal services."" Although

13. Smith, supra note 10, at 19. Smith also believes a favorable result at the disciplinary
proceeding would be of little benefit because the plaintiff, being only a witness - not a party in the disciplinary proceeding, would not be collaterally estopped from pursuing the malpractice
claim. Id. In Irby v. Richardson, 278 S.C. 484, 298 S.E.2d 452 (1982), however, the South
Carolina Supreme Court listed the grievance committee's dismissal of the plaintiff's charge that
the defendant-attorney negligently handled the plaintiff's domestic case as one of several reasons
why the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of the attorney's negligence
in the plaintiff's legal malpractice action. Id. at 487, 298 S.E.2d at 454.
14. See Ronald E. Mallen, Recognizing andDefiningLegalMalpractice,30 S.C. L. REv. 203
passim (1979) (discussing both a theoretical and practical definition for legal malpractice); see
also A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 8, at 6-7
(discussing the expanding definition of legal malpractice).
15. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 8, at 4.
"Conduct on the part of the attorney that is not unique to the legal profession and does not
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most legal malpractice suits are based on negligence, 6 some suits are brought
under a breach of fiduciary duty theory. Additionally, plaintiffs have brought

claims against attorneys for breach of contract, fraud, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, unfair trade practices, and other causes of action. 7 Some
complaints allege a breach of an ethical duty as a cause of action, either alone
or in combination with other causes of action. However, both the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility and the more recent Model Rules of Professional
Conduct expressly state that a violation of an ethical rule does not give rise to
a private cause of action for the violation.'8
Regardless of the theory on which the malpractice claim is based, the
plaintiff must prove the elements of each cause of action. For example, in a
legal malpractice case alleging negligence, the client must establish: (1) the
existence of a legal duty on the part of the attorney to protect the client,
including the standard of care applicable to a competent attorney acting under
similar circumstances; (2) the attorney's breach of that duty; and (3) proximate
cause of the injury to the client. 'I In some cases, therefore, the best defense
may be to force the plaintiff to prove his case. 20
Ordinarily, the plaintiff must use expert testimony to establish the
standard for the attorney's duty of care and breach of that duty.2' Defense
concern the quality of professional services (e.g., fraud) is not considered to be malpractice." Id.
16. 1 S.C. JuR. Attorney and Client § 58 (1991).
17. See id. §§ 59-64 (1991 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the theories of malpractice liability and
observing that a violation of a disciplinary rule is not negligence as a matter of law).
18. MODEL CODE OF PROFEnSSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1983); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Scope (1992). Although standing alone, ethical violations
do not give rise to private causes of action, some of the rules coincide with existing common law
obligations that, if breached, can be the source of a legal malpractice claim. See 1 MALLEN &
SMrrH, supra note 7, § 15.7, at 881. However, the ethical rules should not be used as a
substitute for proof of the attorney's separate common law duties to a client because "[their
purpose is to regulate and guide the legal profession by defining proper ethical conduct, and
'nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the
extra-disciplinaryconsequences of violating such a duty.'" Langford v. State, _
S.C. __, 426
S.E.2d 793, 795 (1993) (quoting S.C. Apr. CT. R. 407 Scope). An expert witness may consider
the ethical rules together with other evidence when forming an opinion concerning whether the
attorney met the appropriate standard of care. Defense counsel, however, should be alert to the
possibility that an expert in legal ethics who has no special knowledge or training in the legal
specialty at issue may attempt to characterize an ethical violation itself as a breach of the standard
of care rather than what it really is: a breach of the standard of conduct only, which alone cannot
support a claim of negligent conduct.
19. See Cianbro Corp. v. Jeffcoat & Martin, 804 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.S.C. 1992) (citing
Shealy v. Walters, 273 S.C. 330, 336, 256 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1979); and South Carolina Ports
Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C. 373, 376, 346 S.E.2d 324, 325 (1986)), aft'd,
10 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 1993) (table).
20. See Frist v. Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, 433 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1970) (holding
that the plaintiff's attempt to establish the attorneys' negligence had, in fact, established their due
diligence).
21. Cianbro Corp., 804 F. Supp. at 790-91 (citing Mali v. Odom, 295 S.C. 78, 81, 367
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counsel should scrutinize the expert witness's qualifications in the particular
area of practice at issue. If the expert's qualifications are limited or nonexistent, then defense counsel should use the lack of qualification to disqualify the
expert opinion on the standard of care and breach.' It is one thing to be
well versed in the rules governing ethical conduct, an area in which "legal
malpractice experts" abound; however, it is quite another matter to have
specialized expertise in the area of law at issue in the case.1

Another hurdle a plaintiff must clear is proving proximate cause and
damages. In essence, the plaintiff in a legal malpractice case must prove both
the malpractice case against the attorney and the underlying case the plaintiff
claims was damaged by the attorney's misconduct - the "case within the
case." 24 In addition, the evidence and legal theories supporting the plaintiff's
claims of vicarious liability against other attorneys affiliated with the
defendant-attorney may be problematic for the plaintiff?15

S.E.2d 166, 168 (Ct. App. 1988)). See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation,
Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to Standardsof Practiceand Negligence in
MalpracticeAction Against Attorney, 14 A.L.R.4TH 170 (1982 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the
requirement of expert testimony in legal malpractice cases).
22. But see supra note 18 ("An expert witness may consider the ethical rules together with
other evidence when forming an opinion concerning whether the attorney met the appropriate
standard of care.") (citation omitted).
23. This principle is routinely applied in other cases requiring expert testimony to establish
negligence. In Perkins v. Volkswagen of America Inc., 596 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1979), a products
liability case, the court affirmed the trial court's decision permitting the plaintiff's expert, a
specialist in mechanical engineering with no experience in designing entire automobiles, to
express expert opinions on general mechanical engineering principles, but refused to allow him
to testify as an expert in automotive design. As observed by the court in Poland v. BeairdPoulan, 483 F. Supp. 1256 (W.D. La. 1980), another products liability case: "One cannot testify
as an expert in regard to a mechanism if he has not had ample opportunity to practically apply
his field of expertise to the mechanism at issue." Id. at 1259; accordBellamy v. Payne, 304 S.C.
179, 403 S.E.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an orthopedic surgeon was not qualified to
serve as expert witness regarding the standard of care in a malpractice case against a podiatrist).
24. See Manning v. Quinn, 294 S.C. 383, 386, 365 S.E.2d 24, 25 (1988) (holding that clients
could not recover in a legal malpractice suit against their attorney because the clients could not
show that "further legal action instituted by [the attorney] 'most probably would have been
successful.'") (quoting Floyd v. Kosko, 285 S.C. 390, 393, 329 S.E.2d 459, 461 (Ct. App.
1985); see also Bridgman, supra note 9, at 234-36 (discussing the defendant's advantage in
forcing the plaintiff to win the case within a case).
25. See generally Stephen E. Kalish, Lawyer Liabilityand Incorporationof the Law Finn:A
Compromise Model Providing Lawyer-Owners with Limited Liability and Imposing Broad
Vicarious Liability on Some Lawyer-Employees, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 563 (1987) (addressing the
issues of lawyers limiting their liability for the negligent acts of their partners by incorporation);
Annotation, Liability of ProfessionalCorporationof Lawyers, or IndividualMembers Thereof,
for Malpracticeor Other Tort of Another Member, 39 A.L.R.4ATH 556 (1985 & Supp. 1993)
(discussing cases in which courts have considered whether individual members of an attorney
corporation can be held liable for the malpractice of another member).
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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B. ContributoryNegligence, Comparative Negligence,
and Assumption of the Risk
Most attorney malpractice actions are based on negligence. The defenses
ordinarily available in negligence actions - which include the sole negligence
of the plaintiff,26 contributory or comparative negligence,27 and assumption
of the risk' - may be raised to defend a negligence-based legal malpractice
claim.
The landmark legal malpractice case addressing contributory negligence
is Theobald v. Byers.29 In Theobald the plaintiff-clients retained the defendant-attorneys to prepare a note and chattel mortgage for a loan the clients
were making to a third party debtor. The attorneys did not inform the clients
(the creditors) that the mortgage had to be perfected by filing. The mortgage
later failed as a secured claim in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, and the
clients sued the attorneys for malpractice. The attorneys argued that the
clients' failure both to inquire whether the mortgage should be recorded and
to actually record the mortgage constituted contributory negligence. 30 After
a bench trial, the trial court agreed and granted judgment for the attorneys.
The appellate court held that contributory negligence was a valid defense,
particularly where the client chooses to disregard the attorney's legal
advice;31 however, the court found the doctrine inapplicable to the facts
presented. The court reasoned that it would be unfair to hold the clients
contributorily negligent
solely because of their failure to themselves perform the very acts for
which they employed [the attorneys]. Such a result cannot be upheld.
Clearly the value of an attorney's services in connection with a transaction
of this nature consists largely of his superior knowledge of the necessary
legal formalities which must be fulfflled in order for a document to be
valid in the eyes of the law.3

26. See supra text accompanying note 24 (discussing proof of the underlying case within the
case).
27. See Bailey v. Martz, 488 N.E.2d 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); United Leasing Corp. v.
Miller, 298 S.E.2d 409 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 302 S.E.2d 248 (N.C. 1983);
Susan L. Thomas, Annotation, Legal Malpractice:Negligence or Faultof Client as Defense, 10
A.L.R.5TH 828, 843 (1993). But see, 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 7, § 17.2, at 4-5
(observing that contributory negligence is not a viable defense under other, non-negligence based
theories of legal malpractice, such as breach of contract).
28. See Mali v. Odom, 295 S.C. 78, 367 S.E.2d 166 (Ct. App. 1988).
29. 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).

30. See id. at 865.
31. Id. at 865-66.
32. Id. at 866-67.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/7
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Theobald's limitation of contributory negligence has been heralded for
promoting "the policy of encouraging client reliance underlying the attorneyclient relationship ....11
Despite the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship,34 "all
courts which have considered the issue have either directly or implicitly held
the [contributory negligence] defense available in a legal malpractice
action."" Thus, either the contributory negligence or comparative fault
defenses will most likely be available, depending upon which defense the
jurisdiction has adopted.3 6 The contributory/comparative negligence defenses
are most often raised in one of the following factual situations:
(1) the failure of the client to supervise, review or inquire concerning the
subject of the attorney's representation; (2) the failure of the client to
follow the attorney's advice or instructions; (3) the failure of the client to
provide essential information; (4) the client's active interference with the
attorney's representation or failure to complete certain responsibilities
regarding the subject matter; and (5) the failure of the client to pursue
remedies to avoid or mitigate the effect of an attorney's negligence. 37
The analysis of the client's contributory/comparative negligence often
intertwines with the client's proof of the attorney's negligence.3" The
attorney's defense counsel should carefully analyze and present evidence
relating to the scope of the attorney's duty of care to the client. While a client

33. Richard S. Novak, Note, Attorney Malpractice:Restrictingthe Availability of the Client
Contributory Negligence Defense, 59 B.U. L. REv. 950, 967 (1979). Novak argues that
attorneys have a duty to protect their client's legal interest even when the client fails to do so and
advocates focusing instead on the scope of the attorneys' duty of care to their clients. Id. at 961-

62.
34. See id. at 961 (arguing in favor of limiting the doctrine's application and stating: "The
fiduciary duties of the attorney and the attorney-client evidentiary privilege highlight both the
strong policy favoring client reliance on the attorney and the nature of the lawyer's role as the
client's alter ego.") (citations omitted).
35.2

MALLEN

& SMrrH, supra note 7,

§ 17.2, at 2.

36. See id. § 17.2, at 4. See generally, F. Patrick Hubbard & Robert L. Felix, Comparative
Negligence in South Carolina:Implementing Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 43 S.C. L. REv.
273 (1992) (addressing South Carolina's adoption of comparative negligence and discussing the
doctrine in other jurisdictions, including tables with state-by-state comparisons).
37.2 MALLEN & SMrrM, supra note 7, § 17.2, at 5. Mallen and Smith discuss each of these
factual situations in depth, including case citations. Id. § 17.2, at 5-10.; see also infra Part III.F
(discussing the client's availability of an alternative remedy to the relief lost by the attorney's
misconduct, such as an alternative cause of action, as a defense to the client's legal malpractice
claim).
38. See id. § 17.2, at 2-3 ("Most of the earlier decisions, which purport to involve
contributory negligence, instead concern acts or omissions by the client which demonstrate or
explain why the attorney was not negligent.").
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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should not be barred or limited from recovery because the client failed to
perform an act that was properly the responsibility of the attorney, neither
should the client be allowed to argue that the attorney committed malpractice
because the attorney failed in some way outside the realm of legal services.
This distinction may sometimes be difficult to make in some circumstances
such as when the attorney's activities fall in the gray area of mixed legal and
business advice. Nevertheless, the client has some responsibility for his own
welfare and should not be allowed to shirk his own duty of care by arguing
that the attorney's duty of care was much broader than custom or practice
suggests.
The defendant-attorney cannot rely as often upon the related doctrine of
assumption of the risk.3 9 Under the assumption of the risk doctrine, the
plaintiff must comprehend both the nature and extent of the risk and
voluntarily assume it,' but laymen do not always understand the law and the
However, in Mali v. Odom42 the
legal ramifications of their actions.4
South Carolina Court of Appeals implicitly approved the use of the client's
assumption of the risk defense in a legal malpractice case.43 In Mali the
defendant-attorney contended that he had advised the plaintiff-clients
concerning restrictive covenants in a parcel of real property the clients later
purchased. Noting that assumption of the risk is ordinarily a question of fact,
the court held that a jury question existed regarding whether the attorney had
Thus, the
actually informed the clients of the restrictive covenants."
assumption of the risk doctrine may be a viable defense to some legal
malpractice claims.

C. Privity
Most jurisdictions still adhere to the privity doctrine and impose liability
only in malpractice cases brought by the attorney's client or those in privity
with the client.45 The trend in a growing number of jurisdictions, however,
39. See HUBbARD & FELIX, supra note 36, at 288 ("Most states other than South Carolina
have either abolished the doctrine of assumption of risk or included it in the state's comparative
fault scheme") (citation omitted).
40. Id.; see also 2 MALLEN & SMrrI, supra note 7, § 17.2, at 10 ("The keystone of the
[assumption of the risk] defense is both a comprehension and willful assumption of the risk.").
41. See 1 S.C. JuR. Attorney and Client § 72, at 174 (1991) ("Because few clients have actual
knowledge of the law and legal tactics, there are few reported decisions expressly addressing the
defense of assumption of risk in a legal malpractice action.").
42. 295 S.C. 78, 367 S.E.2d 166 (Ct. App. 1988).
43. 295 S.C. at 82, 367 S.E.2d at 169.
44. Id. at 80-82, 367 S.E.2d at 168-69.
45. See, e.g., National Say. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879) ("Beyond all doubt,
the general rule is that obligation of the attorney is to his client and not to a third party .... ");
Gaar v. North Myrtle Beach Realty Co., 287 S.C. 525, 528, 339 S.E.2d 887, 889 (Ct. App.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/7
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is to expand the attorney's liability to third persons under proper circumstances." Although a minority approach, third-party recovery in these jurisdictions has been allowed primarily under one of three theories: (1) third-party
beneficiary contract theory; (2) negligence or duty in tort theory, where the
injury to the third party was foreseeable; and (3) a hybrid theory, usually
called the "balancing of factors" theory. 7 A court's decision to relax the
privity requirement may often turn on whether the "end and aim" of the
transaction is to benefit a person not in privity with the attorney."
A typical area of potential third-party liability involves a beneficiary of
a will suing the testator's attorney for negligent drafting of the will.49
Another area of potential third-party liability arises in real estate closings,
when an unrepresented party may claim the attorney's actions foreseeably
damaged him." Clearly, the potential for suits by third parties is limited only
by the imaginations of plaintiffs' lawyers. The privity battle must remain hard
fought or, as the doctrine is chipped away, the potential for attorney liability
will greatly increase."1
D. Statute of Limitations and Laches
The statute of limitations may bar an attorney malpractice action if the

1986) ("[Ain attorney is immune from liability to third persons arising from the performance of
his professional activities as an attorney on behalf of and with the knowledge of his client.").
See generallyMark O'Neill, PrivityDefense inLegalMalpracticeCases:The CitadelStill Stands,

54 DEF. CouNs. J. 511 (1987) (discussing the privity defense to legal malpractice claims).
46. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS'S PROFESSIONAL LiABILITY, supra note 8, at
137; Tom W. Bell, Limits on the Privity and Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims, 59 U.

CHI. L. REv. 1533, 1533-34 (1992) (reciting the following policy goals for the relaxation of the
privity doctrine: "providing remedies to victims of legal malpractice, forcing negligent attorneys
to bear the costs of their behavior, and deterring further legal malpractice"); Joan Teshima,
Annotation, Attorney's Liability, to One Other than Immediate Client, for Negligence in
Connectionwith LegalDuties, 61 A.L.R.4TH 615, 625 (1988 & Supp. 1993).

47. Teshima, supra note 46, at 625.
48. A.B.A. STANDiNG COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LAB LrrY, supra note 8, at 138
(citations omitted).
49. See, e.g., McLane v. Russell, 512 N.E.2d 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that
beneficiaries were proper plaintiffs in a legal malpractice action when the attorney who prepared
the will failed to sever a joint tenancy in property, causing the beneficiaries to not receive the
one-half interest in real property devised to them), aff'd, 546 N.E.2d 499 (111. 1989).
50. See Fox v. Pollack, 226 Cal. Rptr. 532 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that in the absence of
contrary representations by the attorney, the attorney for one party owes no duty of professional
care to an unrepresented party at a real estate closing). Most jurisdictions continue to limit the
closing attorney's liability to the party who retained the attorney. E.g., Langeland v. Farmers
State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. 1982).
51. See Teshima, supra note 46, at 624 ("[A] duty to the general public would impose a huge
potential burden of liability. .. ").
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client fails to act on the malpractice claim in a timely manner. Several
jurisdictions have enacted statutes of limitations that specifically address
attorney malpractice. Other jurisdictions have held that the statute of
limitations which govern general malpractice actions apply to legal malpractice
lawsuits." Other courts determine whether the malpractice claim is a tort,
contract or fraud action, then apply the statute of limitations applicable to that
type of action. 3
The statute of limitation begins to run when a cause of action accrues. 4
The general rule in most jurisdictions is that a wrongful act and damages, even
mere nominal damages, start the limitations period.' The date of accrual,
however, may be postponed under the discovery doctrine. Under the
discovery doctrine, a cause of action does not accrue, and therefore the
limitations period does not begin to run, until the plaintiff "knew or by the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of
6

action."

5

52. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations Governs Damage Action
Against Attorney for Malpractice,2 A.L.R.4TH 284, 288-89 (1984 & Supp. 1993).
53. See id.; see also, Harrison v. Casto, 271 S.E.2d 774, 775 (W. Va. 1980) ("[A] legal
malpractice action may sound in tort or in contract."). Because the limitations period for contract
actions is generally longer than for tort actions, the Harrison court stated: "A complaint that
could be construed as being either tort or on contract will be presumed to be on contract
whenever the action would be barred by the statute of limitations if construed as being in tort."
Id. at 776 (quoting Cochran v. Appalachian Power Co., 246 S.E.2d 624, 628 (,V.Va. 1978)).
The South Carolina legislature has not specifically established a statute of limitations for
attorney malpractice as it has done for doctors, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545 (Law Co-op. Supp.
1993), architects, professional engineers, and contractors. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-3-630 to -670
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1993). Instead, South Carolina continues to utilize the chameleon
approach to defining the statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims. See Burgess v.
American Cancer Society, 300 S.C. 182, 386 S.E.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1989) (including legal
malpractice claims under the general statute of limitations period of section 15-3-530).
54. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
55. See Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 273 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1980). In Jankowski the
Georgia Supreme Court held that special damages are not required for a legal malpractice claim
to accrue and thus start the statute of limitations period. The court stated:
These cases hold that it is not the special damage or injury resulting from the
wrongful act which gives rise to a cause of action, but they also hold that the fact that
nominal damages may be recovered is sufficient to create a cause of action and
therefore result in the statute of limitation's beginning to run. Even in the
jurisdictions which clearly require the sustaining of damage as a triggering device for
the statute of limitation, the suffering of damages to the fullest extent is seldom
required.
Id. at 18.
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). The discovery rule applies to
attorney malpractice actions. Mitchell v. Holler, _ S.C. _, 429 S.E.2d 793 (1993); Burgess
v. American Cancer Society, 300 S.C. 182, 386 S.E.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1989). The South
Carolina Supreme Court first applied the discovery rule to legal malpractice actions as "the more
equitable and rational view" in Mills v. Killian, 273 S.C. 66, 70, 254 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1979).
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The discovery rule is limited in its application. As one commentator has
observed: "[I]f the attorney is guilty of obvious error which even a layman
should recognize as negligence, the discovery rule should not be allowed to
toll the statute .... This rule should be applied only when the negligence of
5
the lawyer would be truly obvious to one untrained in law." 1
The statute of limitations is tolled for some legal malpractice plaintiffs
while they are under a disability." The statute may also be tolled if the
attorney continues representation of the plaintiff.5 9 The attorney may be
estopped from asserting the statute of limitations if the attorney misrepresents
the facts or fraudulently conceals the cause of action from the client6° or
induces the client to delay filing suit until the statutory period expires.61
However, the client's filing of a grievance with a local bar association does
not toll the statute of limitations.62
While the statute of limitations is a viable defense to legal malpractice
actions, it may not apply if the client is seeking an equitable remedy. 63 If so,
the defense counsel must look to the doctrine of laches. 6 In Interdonatov.

As noted by one commentator:
Essentially, since the attorney-clientrelationship is one of the highest fiduciary order,
it is held that even though the attorney's malpractice may have been committed
sufficiently far in the past for the statute of limitations to run, the accrual of the cause
of action does not take place for the purpose of the statute's running until the client
knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the malpractice.
Bridgman, supra note 9, at 238.
57. KiNDREGAN, supra note 2, at 56.
58. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1993) (tolling the statute for
persons who are: "(1) within the age of eighteen years; (2) insane; or (3) imprisoned on a
criminal or civil charge or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a less term than
his natural life.").

But see Mitchell,

_

S.C. at _,

429 S.E.2d at 796 (holding that the

plaintiff in a legal malpractice action could not "claim the benefit of section 15-3-40 because she
was imprisoned on a life sentence when her cause of action accrued").
59. Murphy v. Smith, 579 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1991) (adopting the continuing representation
doctrine).
60. See Madden v. Palmer, 358 N.E.2d 415, 416 (Mass. 1976).
61. See Dillon County Sch. Dist. Number Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 286 S.C.
207, 218-19, 332 S.E.2d 555, 561 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 287 S.C. 234, 337 S.E.2d 697
(1985), and cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E.2d 613 (1986); see
also Interdonatov. Interdonato, 521 A.2d 1124, 1135 (D.C. 1987) (stating in a legal malpractice
case that "[a]
defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiff's
action if he has done anything that would tend to lull the plaintiff into inaction and thereby permit
the statutory limitation to run against him") (quoting Property 10-F, Inc. v. Pack &Process, Inc.,
265 A.2d 290, 291 (D.C. 1970)).
62. Lewis v. Roselle, 578 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
63. See Interdonato, 521 A.2d at 1137 (holding that the statute of limitations did not apply
to an action for a constructive trust, which is an equitable remedy).
64. Id. at 1137 (defining the two elements of the defense of laches as "an unreasonable and
unexplained delay by one party, and prejudice to the other party resulting from the delay").
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Interdonato the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held the defense of

laches barred a claim against an attorney for fraudulent alteration of a will.

6

The court found that the plaintiff knew of the alleged alteration for over thirty
years and that the delay prejudiced the defendant because the drafter of the

will and at least one witness to the will had died in the interim.67
Although the defense of laches was applied in Interdonato, in a legal
malpractice case the defense of laches usually exists only in theory" because
in all likelihood, the strong fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship
will bar use of this equitable defense. 69 Nevertheless, the defense attorney
should consider the doctrine of laches when the client brings an equitable
action against the attorney.

E. PrematurityandAbatement
The defense of prematurity is based on the concept that "[a] suit is

premature if it is brought before the right to enforce it has accrued." 7" The
defense, which serves primarily as a stalling tactic,71 has been raised

successfully in legal malpractice actions.'
Prematurity defenses often involve the defendant-attorney's failure to
bring the underlying suit before the statute of limitations has run. For
example, in Wood v. Anderson the plaintiff alleged that her attorney filed

a malpractice suit against her dentist one day after the statute of limitations
expired.74 The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's action against
her attorney because, under the discovery rule, the plaintiff's suit against the

65. 521 A.2d 1124, 1138 (D.C. 1987).
66. Id. at 1138.
67. Id.
68. See KINDREGAN, supranote 2, at 57 ("Certainly, a court is usually not going to permit
a lawyer to rely on an equitable defense when doing so would give legal approval to a breach of
trust.").
69. See Interdonato, 521 A.2d at 1138 (holding that the defense of laches did not bar other
claims against the attorney). In discussing the elements of laches, the Interdonatocourt stated:
"In considering the reasonableness of the delay, 'the utmost leniency is manifested by the courts
where it appears that the delay is due to the intimate personal relationships existing between the
parties and the high degree of confidence reposed by one in another.'" Id. at 1137 (quoting
Horton v. Horton, 72 F.2d 831, 832 (1934)).
70. Oyefodun v. Spears, 591 So. 2d 1333, 1334 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
71. See 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 17.5, at 13 ("The defense [of prematurity] will
only temporarily forestall a malpractice suit but the benefit of time may demonstrate either the
lack of negligence or injury.").
72. Id. § 17.5, at 13-15.
73. 3 S.E.2d 788 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939).
74. Id. at 789-90.
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dentist might not have been barred by the statute of limitations. 75 The court
noted that the statute of limitations could be waived or tolled by fraud or
concealment and stated:
The bar by the statute of limitations being a personal plea, it may be that
on the trial of the case the defendant would not plead the statute or insist
upon it. There is no evidence whatsoever in the case now before the court
that the plaintiff suffered any damage on the ground that her suit when
filed by her attorney, the defendant, had become barred by the statute of
liMitationS. 76

Other jurisdictions have taken a less rigid approach, holding that a client
need not first sue the defendant in the client's underlying suit and wait until
the defendant raises the statute of limitations before the client can sue the
attorney for allowing the statute to run.' However, when questions exist
about the application of the statute of limitations to the underlying suit, as in
a suit involving the discovery rule, defense counsel should raise the prematurity defense even in jurisdictions that follow this less rigid approach to
application of the defense."
The statute of limitations in the underlying suit is not always the problem;
instead, the statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims
sometimes causes the premature filing of a malpractice action. The underlying
cause of action may still be pending and its results unknown while the statute
of limitations for filing a malpractice suit against the attorney is running. The
client then faces the quandary of either bringing a malpractice suit in which
damages are speculative and remote or risking the statute of limitations. In
these situations, the court may apply the remedy of abatement, which delays
the malpractice suit until the underlying suit is resolved and tolls the statute of
limitations on the malpractice suit.
This result is illustrated by K.J.B., Inc. v. Drakulich,79 in which the
court tolled the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action pending the
resolution of the underlying suit." The court relied upon a recent abatement

75. Id. at 790-91.
76. Id.
77. Hege v. Worthington, Park & Worthington, 26 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135 (Ct. App. 1962);

Roberts v. Heilgeist, 465 N.E.2d 658, 661 (II. App. Ct. 1984); see also Oyefodun v. Spears,
591 So. 2d 1333 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (addressing attorney's prematurity defense when the
attorney allegedly failed to meet a statutory requirement that a medical malpractice suit be filed
within ninety days of a medical review panel decision).
78. See 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 17.5, at 14 (observing that some courts have
held that a legal malpractice claim is premature when the underlying suit is still pending, even
though the underlying suit appears barred by the statute of limitations).
79. 811 P.2d 1305 (Nev. 1991) (per curiam).
80. Id. at 1306. In Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730 (7th Cir.
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case, Semenza v. Nevada Medical Liability Insurance Co.,

1

to reach its

decision.'
Semenza involved a legal malpractice action that was brought
during the appeal of an adverse judgment in the underlying suit. The Semenza
court held that any damages caused by the attorney's alleged malpractice were
speculative and remote because the underlying suit had not been fully
adjudicated, and as such, the malpractice action was premature.
Though the defenses of prematurity and abatement often overlap,
abatement concerns the pendency of another action and is intended to prevent
a multiplicity of suits." "Abatement may be an appropriate remedy where
the malpractice claim is merely an alternative to the client's basic right. ,85
F. Availability ofAnother Remedy
On occasion, an attorney's negligence or other wrongful act may eliminate
one or more theories, remedies, defenses, or defendants otherwise available
to his client, yet still leave the client with other avenues of relief. In this
situation, the client has a duty to mitigate his losses by pursuing those
alternative remedies still available. If the client prevails and thereby suffers
no loss, the attorney obviously has no liability to him for the error. Even if
the client is only partially successful on the alternative remedies, the attorney's
conduct resulted in only a portion of the loss that would have otherwise been
6

sustained.

1976), the court similarly resolved this issue by holding that the legal malpractice suit
may be maintained even though all the damages are not yet ascertainable. If the
[underlying suit's] judgment is not yet final when the [malpractice] case is reached
for trial, the District Court will have a wide discretion in deciding how best to
proceed and may consider, inter alia, postponing the trial or entering a conditional
judgment.
Id. at 734.
81. 765 P.2d 184 (Nev. 1988) (per curiam).
82. K.J.B., Inc., 811 P.2d at 1306.
83. Semenza, 765 P.2d at 186.
84. See generallySarratt v. Wilkins, 104 S.C. 276, 278, 88 S.E. 647, 648 (1916) (discussing
the general policy for abatement - preventing multiplicity of suits); 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra
note 7, § 17.5, at 14-15 n.7 (noting Delesdernier v. Miazza, 151 So. 2d 372, 376 (La. Ct. App.
1963) (Trial court ruled that the legal malpractice suit was premature when the plaintiffs
underlying substantive cases had yet to conclude, thereby leaving undecided the issue of whether
the defendant-attorney's alleged malpractice prejudiced the client.), superseded by statute as
stated in B. Swirsky & Co. v. Bott, 598 So. 2d 1281 (La. Ct. App. 1992)).
85. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 7, § 17.5, at 15 (citing Ginsberg v. Chastain, 501 So.2d
27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)); see Coe v. Burrell, 136 S.C. 410,420, 134 S.E. 373, 375 (1926)
(setting forth the general rule that for a suit to be abated, it must be in the same jurisdiction,
between the same parties, and for the same cause of action and relief as another pending action).
86. See Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2d 654, 658 (N.D. 1989) (citing 2 MALLEN &
SMITH, supra note 7, § 17.6, at 16) ("If an attorney's negligent conduct in representing a client
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In order for the availability of an alternative remedy to operate as a
complete or partial defense, it must be both viable and equivalent.87 In
Andrews v. McDougal8 the court addressed the viability of a proposed
alternative remedy argued by the defendant.8 9 In Andrews the defendantattorney allowed the statute of limitations to run against a shooting victim's
cause of action for battery. The defendant-attorney argued that because his
client had filed suit for trespass, arguably a viable alternative remedy, he was
not liable to his client for damages. The court rejected the defendant's
argument noting that in Arkansas, courts are required to "look to the gist of
[the] case" in determining the applicability of the statute of limitations.' The
court held that the barred action was for battery, not for trespass, and the
client did not have a viable alternative cause of action.9"
However, in Swanson v. Sheppard' the Supreme Court of North Dakota
directed the trial court to abate a malpractice action while an injured client was
given an opportunity to pursue a possible alternative remedy to mitigate his
damages. 93 In Swanson the attorney aided his client in filing a Chapter 7
bankruptcy. The client's student loans could not be discharged in a Chapter
7 filing, but may have been dischargeable under a Chapter 13 plan. The trial
court awarded damages equivalent to the amount of the student loans, but the
appellate court reversed upon the premise that the client may be able to
mitigate his damages by petitioning to have his Chapter 7 case reopened in the
hopes of proceeding with a successful Chapter 13 petition. 4
The court in Winter v. Brown' addressed the equivalency requirement.
The defendant-attorney in the underlying medical malpractice action allowed
the claim against the hospital to become unenforceable by failing to give the
required statutory notice. The attorney argued that the plaintiff could still sue
the hospital employees and physicians, but the court held that this remedy was
not equivalent. The court noted that in an action against the hospital, the
plaintiffs could have applied theories of negligence which were not available
against the other defendants. 96 Further, the court felt that as a practical

leaves the client with an alternative remedy or remedies which are both viable and equivalent,
the result may be that the client suffers no loss or a reduced loss as the proximate cause of the
attorney's negligent conduct.").
87. Id.
88. 731 S.W.2d 779 (Ark. 1987).
89. Id. at 780.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 445 N.W.2d 654 (N.D. 1989).

93. Id. at 658.
94. Id. at 658-59.
95. 365 A.2d 381 (D.C. 1976).
96. Id. at 384-85.
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matter some theories still available against the individual defendants, such as
negligent supervision, would fare better against the hospital than the individual
defendants. 97 Therefore, the court found that the alternative remedies
available to the plaintiffs were not equivalent to that lost by their attorney's
negligence, 98 and their malpractice action against their attorney was not

barred. 99
G. Release andDisclaimer
Lawyers may attempt to shield themselves from professional liability
through the use of a release or disclaimer. The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Rules) strictly limit an attorney's use of these devices as follows:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the
lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and
the client is independently represented in making the agreement, or settle
a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client
without first advising that person in writing that independent representation
is appropriate in connection therewith. 10
Failure to obey this rule may lead to stiff disciplinary penalties, perhaps even
disbarment.'
"This reflects a public policy against lawyers using their
superior positions to exact 'hold harmless' provisions in legal employment
contracts. " 102

97. Id. at 385.
98. Id. at 386 (holding that plaintiff did not have to exhaust all possible defendants in the
underlying medical malpractice case before seeking a remedy against the defendant-attorney).
But see Bartholomew v. Crockett, 475 N.E.2d 1035, 1041-42 (I1. App. Ct. 1985) (holding
plaintiff's claim for defendant-attorney's alleged malpractice had not yet accrued and therefore
was non-existent); Evans v. Detweiler, 466 So. 2d 800, 803 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
plaintiff's failure to allege that defendant-attorney's alleged malpractice left plaintiffs without a
remedy under state law or no equivalent under federal law warranted a finding that plaintiffs
petition failed to state a cause of action).
99. Id. at 384.
100. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) (1992); accord S.C. APP. CT.
R. 407, § 1.8 (h).
101. See In re Hanna, 301 S.C. 310, 312-13, 391 S.E.2d 728, 728-29 (1990) (disbarring
attorney for, among other things, his attempt to use hold-harmless clause); ROBERT M. WILCOX,
SOUTH CAROLINA LEGAL ETHIcs § 5.1.3 (1992) (citing In re Hanna, 294 S.C. 56, 362 S.E.2d
632 (1987); In re Amick, 288 S.C. 486, 343 S.E.2d 623 (1986); In re Clarke, 278 S.C. 627, 300
S.E.2d 595 (1983)).
102. KINDREGAN, supra note 2, at 58. See S.C. Adv. Op. # 85-30. According to this ethics
advisory opinion, in-house counsel may not enter into an agreement with their employer limiting
their liability to the corporation. The company, however, may agree to indemnify counsel from
liability to third parties. This opinion was decided under the prior Code of Professional
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/7
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For this reason and because of the fiduciary nature of an attorney-client
relationship," courts have also strictly limited the release defense in
malpractice actions. A defense based upon a boiler-plate release in a retainer
agreement has rarely been upheld." ° Similarly, a release entered into during
the course of representation is also suspect. 0 5 However, a release may form
a successful defense if it results from the settlement of a malpractice
claim."° The release must be fairly and knowingly made and supported by
consideration." ° Under the Rules, an attorney must advise the client in
writing that independent representation is appropriate before settlement. 08

In Donnelly v. Ayer,"° a release agreement was upheld in a malpractice
action even though the client was unrepresented. However, the client had
previously consulted several other attorneys."10 Releases may be attacked
as a product of duress"' or as contrary to public policy."' Further, because of the fiduciary obligations owed by an attorney to his client, a release
of liability is presumptively void, and the attorney bears the burden of proving
that the agreement was fair and reasonable." 3
Responsibility.
103. Ames v. Putz, 495 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (stating the relationship
between attorney and client is highly fiduciary, and a release executed between them will be
presumed to be unfair or invalid).
104. 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 17.10, at 42-43 (addressing release attempt prior
to client's discovery of attorney's error).
105. See Ames, 495 S.W.2d at 582-83.
106. Donnelly v. Ayer, 228 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767-83 (1986) (holding that a release executed by
the client after receiving one thousand dollars as well as attorney's agreement not to seek
collection of advancements was a complete defense); McElmurry v. Nine, 279 N.W.2d 301,302
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (emphasizing that "It]he release referred specifically to the instant
litigation."). But see Adell v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver and Schwartz, P.C., 428 N.W.2d 26,
28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (addressing the issue of the scope of the release and holding that the
release of the tax claims did not bar action based upon the partnership's improper formation);
Arana v. Koerner, 735 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that when plaintiff expressed
a clear and specific intent not to release attorneys, subsequent release of joint tort-feasor did not
release attorneys).
107. McElmurry, 279 N.W.2d at 302 (settlement of disputed claims satisfies consideration
requirement to uphold a release).
108. S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, Rule 1.8(h); see Marshall v. Higginson, 813 P.2d 1275, 1277
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an attorney's only duty under Rule 1.8(h) of Washington's
Rules of Professional Conduct was to advise the client"that advice from independent counsel was
appropriate before he signed the release").
109. 228 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
110. Id. at 767.
111. See generally Interdonato v. Interdonato, 521 A.2d 1124, 1134 (D.C. 1987) (discussing
invalidation of a release for duress).
112. Marshall, 813 P.2d at 1278 (noting release agreement violated public policy and was
invalid when attorney misled client into believing that she would not testify in a separate
proceeding if the client did not sign the release).
113. Ames v. Putz, 495 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); see 2 MALLEN & SMrrH,
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The underlying policy controlling the use of releases is also applicable to
liability disclaimers." 4 In Owen v. Neely"' the court expressly acknowledged an attorney's right to protect himself by noting reservations and
disclaimers in a certificate of title under some circumstances. 116 The
disclaimer stated that the certificate of title was "subject to any information
that would be revealed by an accurate survey of the real estate and subject to
any information that would be revealed by a personal inspection of the
premises . . . . "17 The court limited the attorney's ability to disclaim to
situations when the attorney "has no reasonable grounds to suspect the actual
existence of defects not mentioned.""'
H. Waiver and Ratification
"A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right."" 9 Often,
defense counsel cannot successfully use a waiver defense because of the
fiduciary relationship that exists between the defendant-attorney and the
client. 2 ' However, in Mauldin v. Weinstock' the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff waived his rights in the underlying transaction,
and thereby waived any claim based upon legal malpractice." The plaintiff
was terminated from his job with Eastern Air Lines. When the plaintiff
appealed the termination, Eastern rejected his appeal because it was filed late.
His attorney advised him to commence a suit challenging Eastern's contention,
but the plaintiff did not authorize the attorney to initiate such a suit."u The
appellate court upheld the trial court's application of "the rule of waiver by
conduct" and affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the attorney. 2
Ratification is another difficult escape passage for an attorney. InL.F.S.

supra note 7, § 17.10, at 44 (noting that failure to sustain this burden is often accompanied by
a finding of fraud or coercion).
114. 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 17.10, at 44.
115. 471 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1971).
116. Id. at 708.
117. Id. at 707 (quoting the actual disclaimer).
118. Id.at 708.
119. Stovall Bldg. Supplies, Inc. v. Mottet, 305 S.C. 28, 35, n.3, 406 S.E.2d 176, 180 n.3
(Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 305 S.C. 28, 406 S.E.2d 176 (1991); see 2 MALLEN & SMITH,
supra note 7, § 17.11, at 46 (also using the term "abandonment").
120. KINDREGAN, supra note 2, at 61 (noting the scarcity of case law on the subject).
121. 411 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
122. Id.at 374.
123. Id.at 371, 374 (noting that legitimate grounds existed to challenge Eastern's contention
and that plaintiff's failure to act "in effect" prevented his attorney from proving the timeliness
of the filing).
124. Id.at 374-75.
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Corp. v. Kennedy"z a law firm successfully defended a malpractice suit
arguing ratification as a defense. 6 The plaintiff-corporation alleged that the
law firm did not follow settlement instructions and permitted summary
judgment based upon an unauthorized agreement. However, prior to filing the
malpractice action, the company accepted financial benefits extended under the
order and sought advice concerning enforcement of the order. The appellate
court found these acts to be "clear, unequivocal actions of ratification. "127
L Compromise with Third Party
Accepting a settlement in an underlying action does not bar a client from
bringing a malpractice suit." However, settlement may affect the extent of
damages recoverable against the defendant-attorney. 2 9 The plaintiff is not
entitled to a double recovery. 3 '
In Katzenberger v. Bryan 3 ' the alleged malpractice involved a negligent
The court pointed out that the underlying suit against
title examination.'
the sellers (for breach of warranty in the deed) was in contract, and the
malpractice action was in tort. 3 Because both the nature and measure of
125. 287 S.C. 162, 337 S.E.2d 209 (1985).
126. Id. at 163, 337 S.E.2d at 210. But see 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 17.11, at
47 n.4 (addressing the difficulties of proving ratification by stating:
[A] ratification, made in ignorance of material facts, cannot give validity to the acts
of an attorney in the conduct of a suit, or repel the imputation of fraud. To give any
effect, therefore, to any expressions of this nature, the previous foundation must be
laid, that there has been a full disclosure of facts on the part of the attorney, and that
the ratification is the result of a judgment acting upon knowledge, and not upon a
blind personal confidence in the general integrity of the agent.
(quoting Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386, 1391 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17733)).
127. L.F.S. Corp., 287 S.C. at 164, 337 S.E.2d at 210; see also Schmid v. National Bank of
Greece, 622 F. Supp. 704, 713 (D.C. Mass. 1985), aff'd, 802 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1986) (table)
(illustrating a ratified execution of release when a party accepts an unsecured promissory note).
128. Wolcott v. Ginsburg, 746 F. Supp. 1113, 1117 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs
could still pursue a malpractice action against their attorneys even though they had accepted a
settlement in the underlying matter, because their settlement was less than what they could have
recovered but for the attorneys' malpractice); Keramati v. Schackow, 553 So. 2d 741, 745 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (noting settlement of underlying medical malpractice action did not bar
attorney malpractice action, but may contribute to mitigation of damages against attorney); King
v. Cranford, Whitaker & Dickens, 385 S.E.2d 357, 360 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that will
proponents did not elect their remedy by subsequently agreeing to a settlement in the underlying
probate claim and therefore were entitled to pursue malpractice claim), review denied by, 389
S.E.2d 813 (N.C. 1980).
129. Katzenberger v. Bryan, 141 S.E.2d 671, 676 (Va. 1965); see 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra
note 7, § 17.15, at 58-59.
130. Katzenberger, 141 S.E.2d at 676.
131. 141 S.E.2d 671 (Va. 1965).
132. Id. at 674.
133. Id. at 675-76 (holding that accord and satisfaction took place in the contract action, but
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damages were different, the acceptance of a settlement with the sellers of the
contract claim did not act as an accord and satisfaction of the malpractice
claim. However, the court did limit recovery of damages in the malpractice
claim to prevent double recovery. 34
J. Res Judicata, CollateralEstoppel, and Equitable Estoppel
After a court decides that a defendant-attorney's actions were valid and
not malpractice, the issue may not be relitigated. The defendant may rely
upon the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation
of the issue of the propriety of the defendant-attorney's actions. Similarly,
once a party takes a stance in an underlying matter, equitable estoppel may
prevent the party from changing his or her position in a later legal malpractice
action. Equitable estoppel does not require a judgment to have been rendered
on the disputed issue as a prerequisite to its invocation.
When a lawyer's degree of skill in handling a matter has been adjudicated
in another suit, and the issue was decided in his favor, the issue is res
judicata,135 or settled, and may not be litigated again, 3 6 Res judicata will
not appear as a viable defense in most legal malpractice cases, simply because
the attorney rarely will have been a party or in privity with a party in a prior
suit. 137 Nevertheless, the prior litigation may decide the propriety of the
attorney's actions in connection with an allegation of
conspiracy or other joint
3
action with a party, and thus dispose of the issue.1 1
The issue in question need not actually be litigated in order for res
judicata to apply. If the issue could have been litigated in a previous action
between the parties, the judgment has res judicata effect.'39 In Compusort
v. Goldberg"4 res judicata barred a negligence claim against an attorney,
because the plaintiff could have raised the issue of attorney's negligence in a
prior action by the defendant-attorney to collect legal fees. 4 '
not in the tort action).
134. Id. at 676; see 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 17.15, at 59 (citing Katzenberger,
for the proposition "A recovery from the third party may be considered in mitigation where the
payment involves substantially the same damages.").
135. Res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits of a case bars a subsequent
action between the same parties or their privies over the same cause of action.
136. See Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1518 (9th Cir. 1985), supersededby
statuteon other grounds as stated in Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg., S.A., 842 F.2d 1154
(9th Cir. 1988); Interdonatov. Interdonato, 521 A.2d 1124, 1131 n.11 (D.C. 1987) (observing
that a final judgment on the merits is the crucial element of res judicata).
137. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 7, § 17.12, at 49.
138. See Eadon v. Reuler, 361 P.2d 445, 449 (Colo. 1961).
139. Compusort, Inc. v. Goldberg, 606 F. Supp. 456, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
140. 606 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
141. Id. at 457-58.
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Res judicata may apply to a plaintiff, barring a subsequent action, even
though the plaintiff had no opportunity to participate in the underlying action
if the plaintiff was in privity with a party in the underlying case.142 Privity,
for purposes of res judicata, requires a legal connection or identity of interest
between the parties-similar interest in the outcome of litigation is not
enough. 143 In Schonbergerv. Serchuk'" the New York District Court held
that a legal malpractice plaintiff was bound by his son's decision to drop a
counterclaim against the attorneys in an underlying mortgage foreclosure
action.145 Privity, for purposes of res judicata, was not based on the
father/son relationship, but rather upon the father's relationship as a guarantor
for his son's debt.' 46 The father and son stood in the same position vis-a-vis
the subject matter and were affected equally by their actions. 47
Like res judicata, collateral estoppel, also known as judicial estoppel,
assumes that an issue was decided by prior litigation. Therefore, the same
issue may not be litigated again. 4 ' However, collateral estoppel will by
nature be a better defense in a legal malpractice action than res judicata,
49
because privity is not always required.
In Irby v. Richardson50 the South Carolina Supreme Court applied
collateral estoppel in a legal malpractice action.'
In Irby a father apparently consented to his former wife assuming custody of the couple's children
during a divorce proceeding. The court noted that the father had voluntarily
waived his right to contest custody in the underlying case. The father then
brought a legal malpractice action against his attorney some five years later,
alleging that the attorney willfully failed to prepare his case and forced him to
settle the divorce proceeding with the wife having custody of the children.
The court held that the issues of the father's consent as to custody, as well as
the other essential issues involved in the malpractice claim, had been decided
in the underlying family court proceedings. Therefore, the court precluded the

142. Schonberger v. Serchuk, 742 F. Supp. 108, 115-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting Rutgers
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dickerson, 521 A.2d 373, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)).
143. See, Rutgers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dickerson, 521 A.2d 373, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987).
144. 742 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
145. Id. at 116.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 17.13, at 50 (describing collateral estoppel as a
refinement of res judicata, and noting the frequent confusion between the two).
149. Id. (noting that "[e]ven where complete privity is still required, however, some courts
limit the use of the doctrine to preclude relitigation of those facts which are common to
alternative legal theories").
150. 278 S.C. 484, 298 S.E.2d 452 (1982).
151. 278 S.C. at 487, 298 S.E.2d at 454.
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plaintiff from relitigating those issues.'52
Some courts have adopted the following four-factor test' to determine
whether collateral estoppel is a viable defense: (1) whether the issues in the
two cases are identical;" (2) whether there was a final judgment on the
merits; 5 (3) whether the party against whom the defense is asserted is a
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether a
failure to apply the defense will work an injustice. 5 6 The party asserting
collateral estoppel bears the burden of pleading and proving that the relevant
issues were decided in his favor in the previous action. 7
In some jurisdictions, the privity requirement has been relaxed in that the
party asserting the defense does not have to be a party or privy to the
underlying action.'
Traditionally, the scope of collateral estoppel has been
limited by the doctrine of mutuality. Under this doctrine, neither a party nor
their privies could use a prior judgment as an estoppel against the opposing
party unless both parties or their privies were bound by the judgment. The
use of collateral estoppel, whether offensively or defensively, is no longer
predicated on mutuality of interest.' 59 Thus, if an issue in a prior case has
been litigated and was essential to the prior judgment, nonnutual collateral
estoppel may preclude relitigation of the issue in the subsequent case, even
though one of the parties disputing the issue was not bound by the prior
judgement.W
The issue of malpractice or attorney negligence need not be the only issue

considered in the underlying action in order for collateral estoppel to apply.
152. Id.
153. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 7, § 17.13, at 51.
154. Beckwith v. Llewellyn, 391 S.E.2d 189, 191-92 (N.C. 1990) (holding that the issue of
a court's approval of a settlement in the underlying case did not collaterally estop the client from
asserting a malpractice claim since the two issues were not identical).
155. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 1198 (1969 & Supp. 1994).
156. See Connelly v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 463 F. Supp. 914, 918 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (holding that a corporate president was collaterally estopped from asserting that a
malpractice claim was assigned to him by the corporation when a prior decision in another
jurisdiction held that no assignment of the malpractice actions had taken place).
157. Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1518 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing e.g.,
Hernandez v. City of Los Angles, 624 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1980)), supersededby statute on
other grounds as stated in Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg., S.A., 842 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.
1988).
158. Brock v. Owens, 532 A.2d 1168, 1172 (Pa. Super.'Ct. 1987) (citing Thompson v.
Karastan Rug Mills, 323 A.2d 341, 344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974)).
159. See Blonder-Tongue Lab. Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50
(1971); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979), limited by United States
v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984); Beall v. Doe, 281 S.C. 363, 370, 315 S.E.2d 186, 190 (Ct.
App. 1984).
160. Beall, 281 S.C. at 370, 315 S.E.2d at 190-91 (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982) as a guideline).
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The doctrine may be invoked even if the issue in question was only one of
several grounds on which the original decision was based. 1 In fact, 'the
doctrine applies to each point as if it was the only issue litigated. In addition,
"[a]bsent a statute to the contrary, a pending appeal does not destroy the
finality of the judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel."162 Even if the
underlying judgment on which collateral estoppel is based is erroneous, the
client is generally precluded from attacking the judgment and relitigating the
issue. 163
Collateral estoppel is frequently raised in malpractice actions arising out
of the defense of criminal cases"&4 and in actions concerning the validity of
documents drafted by the lawyer."
The defense of equitable estoppel, unlike res judicata or collateral
estoppel, does not depend upon a prior judgment that precludes a party from
relitigating an issue. Estoppel is a bar that prevents a party from alleging or
denying facts which are inconsistent with prior statements, allegations, or
conduct."6 Estoppel's applicability is not limited to the context of a
litigation.
In Bankers Trust v. Bruce67 the debtors in an appeal of a foreclosure
action alleged that the amount of deficiency judgment against them was
negatively affected by their attorney's malpractice and conflict of interest in
the underlying foreclosure action. 6 However, the debtors had consented
to the attorney's representation of them after the attorney had disclosed his
firm's pre-existing relationship with the foreclosing financial institution. 6 9
Furthermore, the court noted that the debtors had instructed their attorney of
the specific tactic to be used in the foreclosure action. The attorney was to
avoid delaying the foreclosure so that the property could be sold quickly and
the interest rate thereby reduced from the contract rate to the statutory

161. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 7, § 17.13, at 52 (citing e.g., Roberts v. Flanagan, 410
N.W.2d 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)).
162. Connelly v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 463 F. Supp. 914, 918 n.3 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (citing RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, JUDGEMENTS § 41 cmt. d; § 69, cmt. e).
163. Mazer v. Security Ins. Group, 507 F.2d 1338, 1342 (3d Cir. 1975).
164. Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that a convicted murderer
plaintiff was collaterally estopped from charging his court-appointed attorney with negligence
when the Illinois Supreme Court had found a "clear want of merit" in the plaintiff's contentions
against the defendant-attorney).
165. Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that a client could not
relitigate an issue in a legal malpractice action when his attorney had explained the terms of a
partnership dissolution agreement to him because a bankruptcy court had determined the
attorney's conduct was proper).
166. 2 MALLEN & SMrTH, supra note 7, § 17.14, at 55.
167. 283 S.C. 408, 323 S.E.2d 523 (Ct. App. 1984).
168. Id. at 415, 323 S.E.2d at 527.
169. Id. at 419-20, 323 S.E.2d at 530.
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rate. 170 The debtors would then attempt to further reduce the deficiency
under the appraisal process.'' This strategy failed, and the debtors attempted to reopen the deficiency judgment by alleging that the attorney had a
conflict of interest that affected his zeal in representing them. The court
rejected this argument holding that the client-debtors were estopped from
claiming their attorney failed to raise other defenses in the foreclosure action
because of their specific instructions to him."
Estoppel is commonly used to prevent a client from taking a position
contrary to that previously urged in a document." This is particularly true
when the document was prepared by someone other than the attorney being
sued. If the basis of estoppel is a pleading prepared by the defendant-attorney,
the defense is only available if the client knowingly assented to statements in
the document.'74
Estoppel may not be available when the client's position involves a legal
rather than a factual matter. If the client was incapable of understanding the
effect of an approved document, he may not be precluded from changing his
position and arguing against it in a subsequent malpractice action. 7
Although estoppel bars a client from deviating from prior positions or
testimony in alleging attorney malpractice, it does not prevent a client from
claiming that a settlement to which he agreed was inadequate because of his
lawyer's negligence. '76
K. Immunity
Attorneys may be sued for malpractice they commit while performing
public duties. However, governmental immunity from suits for damages has77
been repeatedly extended to such public officials as judges and legislators.'
Solicitors or prosecutors acting "within the scope of [their] duties in initiating

170. Id. at 421-22, 323 S.E.2d at 531-32.

171. Id. at 422, 343 S.E.2d at 531-32.
172. Bankers Trust v. Bruce, 283 S.C. 408, 422, 323 S.E.2d 523, 532 (Ct. App. 1984).
173. Hurd v. DiMento & Sullivan, 440 F.2d 1322 (1st Cir.) (holding plaintiff was estopped
from asserting that the defendant-attorney claimed to represent her when she admitted in a
pleading that the defendant was unable to represent her "because of other commitments"), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 862 (1971).
174. 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 17.14, at 58.
175. Id.

176. See Oakes & Kanatz v. Schmidt, 391 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
177. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). "[Plublic officers require this protection to
shield them from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of
liability." Id. at 806. The immunity granted can either be absolute or qualified. Generally,
officials performing special functions, such as legislators and judges, are entitled to absolute
immunity, which provides complete protection from suit. Conversely, executive officials are only
entitled to qualified immunity.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/7
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and pursuing a criminal prosecution"' are entitled to absolute immunity
from suit.' 79 An immunity issue may also arise in a malpractice case
brought by a criminal defendant against his court-appointed attorney.
Historically, court-appointed defense attorneys and public defenders
enjoyed the same immunity as prosecutors and judges, especially in civil rights
actions involving claims of wrongful acts under color of state law.'
However, recent Supreme Court decisions have recognized that courtappointed attorneys and public defenders are not immune from malpractice
claims arising from the representation of indigent clients, even when the state
assigns them as defense counsel and pays for their services."'
The Supreme Court in Tower v. Glovertn and Ferri v. Ackermanlu
reasoned that appointed counsel"8 and public defenders"S are not entitled
to absolute immunity, because they do not represent the public as a whole;
rather, they are paid by the state to represent the individual in the same
manner as privately retained counsel. The policy reasons that support granting
of immunity to prosecutors and judges are not applicable to public defenders
and appointed counsel, because they do not represent the public. 8 6 Also,
if appointed counsel and public defenders are afforded absolute immunity,
indigent clients would not have the same remedies for inadequate legal service
as paying clients.'1 7
While absolute immunity has been expressly denied to appointed counsel
and public defenders, the availability of qualified immunity is not so clear.
Recent cases have upheld qualified immunity for both public defenders, 8t 8
and for appointed special counsel, 8 9 as long as the attorney's behavior does
178. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
179. Id. at 410.
180. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 7, § 17.7, at 17-20; see Annotation, PublicDefender's
Immunity From Liabilityfor Malpractice, 6 A.L.R.4TH 774 (1981 & Supp. 1993).
181. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) (noting appointed counsel was not immune from
malpractice liability for allegedly conspiring with state officials to deprive client of his
constitutional rights); Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979) (noting that an appointed attorney
is not entitled to absolute immunity against an indigent client's claim in a malpractice action);
see also Sullivan v. Freeman, 944 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding public defenders do not
enjoy absolute immunity under Illinois law).
182. 467 U.S. 914 (1984).
183. 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
184. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 205.
185. See Tower, 467 U.S. at 921-23 (noting that42 U.S.C. § 1983 on its face does not provide
for immunities for public defenders).
186. See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 7, § 17.7, at 21.
187. See id. (citing Ronald E. Mallen, The Court-AppointedLawyerand Legal MalpracticeLiability or Immunity, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 59, 69 (1976)).
188. Keating v. Martin, 638 F.2d 1121, 1122 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiamn); Dodson v. Polk
County, 628 F.2d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
189. Canadian Javelin, Ltd. v. Lawler, Kent & Eisenberg, 478 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D.D.C.
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not disqualify him for protection under qualified immunity."

°

L. Misconduct in the Underlying Transaction
A plaintiffs misconduct can form a defense for legal malpractice.
"[C]ourts should not lend their aid to one who founds a cause of action on an
immoral or illegal act. ""'
In Goldstein v. Lustig'" a dentist was fired
after he committed insurance fraud." 3 The dentist sought recovery of his
lost resignation benefits from the attorney who advised him to wait to be
terminated before suing his employer. The Illinois Supreme Court held that
even if the dentist had resigned, he would not have been entitled to his
resignation benefits because of his illegal acts. The dentist's misconduct, not
the soundness of the attorney's advice, was the cause of his loss.94
Misconduct by the plaintiff may also bar suit when the plaintiff alleges
immoral or illegal conduct by counsel. In Pantely v. Garris, Garris and
Garris,95 the plaintiff perjured herself in the underlying domestic relations
action, allegedly on the advice of her attorneys.19 When the judgment of
divorce was set aside based upon this issue, the plaintiff sued her attorneys for
malpractice."9 The court relied upon the doctrine of in pari delicto"9 ' and
held that the perjury barred the malpractice claim.' 99 The plaintiff argued
unsuccessfully that her suit should not be barred because her degree of fault
was far less than that of her attorneys, 2" and because public policy requires
errant members of the bar to be disciplined. 2"' The court held that plaintiff

1979).
190. Dadson, 628 F.2d at 1108 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) for the
proposition that qualified immunity can be lost if "[tihe defender oversteps the immunity
boundary, however, if he acts in a manner which he knows or reasonably should know will
violate the constitutional rights of his client, or if he acts with the malicious intention to injure
his client").
191. Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, P.C., 447 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
192. 507 N.E.2d 164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
193. Id. at 166-67.
194. Id. at 168.
195. 447 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
196. Id. at 865-66.
197. Id.
198. The court explains that this common law doctrine derives from the maxim, "in pari
delicto potior est conditio defendentis," which means that "in cases of equal fault, the position
of the defendant is stronger." Id. at 867.
199. Id. at 869.
200. Id. at 868 (admitting that circumstances may exist which would support such an
exception, but holding that one does not need a law degree to understand that perjury is immoral
and illegal).
201. Pantely, 447 N.W.2d at 868.
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and her attorneys were equally at fault, and the attorneys' misconduct could
be punished by other means which would not directly benefit the perjuring
client.ra
The same principles that underlie in pai delicto support the defense of
unclean hands, 3 although this doctrine does not require the party with
unclean hands to be at least equally culpable.'
An attorney cannot be held
liable for disclosing a client's misconduct. 2°5
M. Indemnity and Contribution, Unjust Enrichment,
and Mitigation of Damages
Once a case appears headed to trial, the defense counsel should look for
opportunities to shift, spread, or reduce the defendant-attomey's liability.
Defense counsel may start with the doctrines of indemnity and contribu-

tion.

6

In Roberts v. Heilgeist, 7 a defendant-attorney in a malpractice

action sought contribution from his former client's subsequent attorneys who
were hired to bring the malpractice action." 5 The defendant-attorney
advanced two theories under which he believed he should recover contribution
from his former client's present attorneys: (1) the present attorneys knew that
the statute of limitations was not a bar, but an affirmative defense to be
pleaded by the tortfeasor, and therefore were negligent in failing to bring suit
because the tortfeasor may not have raised the defense at trial; and (2) the
present attorneys negligently failed to collect ajudgement they obtained against
another defendant sued within the limitations period, contributing to the
plaintiff's failure to recover from any tortfeasor.1
The court denied
contribution on the first theory, holding that the present attorneys had no duty
to bring suit against the tortfeasor once the statute of limitations had run.21 0

202. Id. at 868-89 (noting that misconduct by the attorneys could be addressed with
disciplinary actions, contempt of court proceedings, and criminal prosecution).
203. See id. at 867.
204. See 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 17.4, at 12 (citing Pond v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 198 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1984) (applying unclean hands to a malicious prosecution
action)).
205. 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 17.4, at 11.
206. Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Legal Malpractice:Defendant'sRight to Contributionor
Indemnity from OriginalTortfeasor, 20 A.L.R.4TH 338 (1983 & Supp. 1993). See generally,
Robert H. Brunson, Contributionin South Carolina- Venturing into UnchartedWaters, 41 S.C.

L. REv. 533 (1990) (discussing the law of contribution in South Carolina); James C. Gray, Jr.
& Lisa D. Catt, The Law of Indemnity in South Carolina, 41 S.C. L. REV. 603 (1990)

(discussing South Carolina indemnity law).
207. 465 N.E.2d 658 (Il. App. Ct. 1984).
208. Id. at 659-60.
209. Id. at 660.
210. Id. at 661.
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The court then held that the defendant-attorney was not entitled to contribution
under his second theory, because his liability and the liability of the present
attorneys did not arise from the same injury.2" However, if the causes of
action against a defendant-attorney and another tortfeasor do arise from the
same injury, the attorney may be entitled to contribution. 2
A defendant-attorney may attempt to recover under the theory of unjust
enrichment when their actions benefit a third-party, such as the plaintiff's
adversary in the underlying action.'
Although little case law exists on this
214
subject, an unjust enrichment argument has succeeded in a few cases.
The defense counsel may also argue that mitigation of damages is a factor
to be considered.2" 5 "In all actions where a plaintiff is seeking to recover
damages, the plaintiff has a duty to minimize or mitigate damage and may not
recover for damage which could have been avoided by reasonable efforts
under the existing circumstances." 2" 6 If the client is cooperative, the
attorney may attempt to repair the earlier damage and thus, avoid a malpractice lawsuit. 1 7

N. Mental Disability
Mental disability of the attorney cannot serve as a defense in actions
brought under negligence theories. 218 However, it may serve to negate the
necessary element of wrongful intent in cases involving fraud, criminal
activity, and intentional torts.2 19

211. Id. at 662 (finding merit in other courts' decisions holding that "suits by a former lawyer
against a current or succeeding lawyer contravene public policy").
212. 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 17.16, at 63 (citing Crawford v. Gray and Assocs.,
493 So. 2d 734 (La. Ct. App.) (involving land surveyor who also erred), writ denied, 497 So.
2d 1012 (La.), and writ denied, 497 So. 2d 1013 (La. 1986).
213. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 7, § 17.17 at 63-64.
214. Marine Midland Bank Cent. v. Auburn Inn, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (finding legal malpractice insurer would be entitled to subrogation based on unjust
enrichment). But see Succession of Killingsworth (Tuttle v. Schlater), 270 So. 2d 196 (La. Ct.
App. 1972) (rejecting an unjust enrichment argument in a case arising out of a defectively drawn
will, because the beneficiary of the will was completely innocent), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
292 So. 2d 536 (La. 1974).
215. See text accompanying notes 81-91 (discussing the plaintiff's duty to pursue other
available remedies); text accompanying notes 117-122 (discussing the effect of the plaintiff's
compromise settlement with a third party).
216. Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2d 654, 658 (N.D. 1989) (citing Smith v. Watson, 406
N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1987)).
217. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 7, § 17.18, at 64 (citing Joe Holloway, The Claim
RepairSystem, 52 FLA. B.J. 94 (1978)).
218. Schumann v. Crofoot, 602 P.2d 298 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that insanity was not
a defense for an attorney alleged to have negligently lost his client's money).
219. See Michael J.Davidson, "Aces Over Eights" - PathologicalGambling as a Criminal
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/7
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IV. SLAP BACK SUITS AND COUNTERCLAIMS

When allegations of malpractice are brought against an attorney, the
attorney may initially want to strike back with a counterclaim or a subsequent
suit motivated by a desire to "slap back." If he prevails in the legal
malpractice case, he may consider bringing an action for malicious prosecution.'
A defendant-attorney can also assert counterclaims to the malpractice action, such as for defamation,"1 abuse of process, or outrage. Caution
and reasoned judgment are advised.

In Swanson v. Sheppard' the appellate court remanded the action for
a determination of whether Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed against the
defendant, who had filed a counterclaim seeking damages for defamation.Y1
The trial court had found that the defendant counterclaimed "'simply to
discourage the plaintiff from continuing with his cause of action.'"'
Public
policy does not support these means of discouraging litigants from seeking
redress from the courts." However, such tactics may be justifiable under
particular circumstances. In fact, the suit brought against the attorney may
itself be frivolous and fall under the sanctions of Rule 11 or other statute or
rule designed to inhibit frivolous cases.
An attorney likewise should exercise caution in initiating a lawsuit against
a client to collect fees. 6 Such a suit may be met with a counterclaim for
malpractice. 7 However, once a client has brought a malpractice claim, a

Defense, ARMY LAVYER, Nov. 1989, at 11, 13; Jack S. Nordby, The Burdened Privilege:
Defending Lawyers in DisciplinaryProceedings, 30 S.C. L. REv. 363, 438 (1979) (noting that
"[a]lcoholism is doubtless the most common medical affliction of lawyers, almost, as reputedly
with poets, an occupational hazard").
220. See Ronald E. Mallen, An Attorney's Liabilityfor Malicious Prosecution,A Misunderstood Tort, INS. COUNSEL J. 407, 407 (1979) (remarking on such suits brought by "irate

physicians seeking revenge for an unsuccessful medical malpractice action or pursuing the belief
that suing lawyers will deter future medical malpractice suits").
221. See Debra T. Landis, Criticismor DisparagementofAttorney's Character,Competence,
or Conduct as Defamation, 46 A.L.R.4TH 326 (1986 & Supp. 1993).
222. 445 N.W.2d 654 (N.D. 1989).
223. Id. at 659. The court assumed that the trial court "found [the defendant] violated the rule
but refused to impose sanctions because [the plaintiff] incurred no additional expense"; the court
held that such action would constitute error because sanctions were mandatory if a violation had,
in fact occurred. Id.
224. Id. (quoting the trial court).
225. KiNDREGAN, supra note 2, at 63 (advising attorneys generally not to pursue such
counterclaims and stating: "Courts have consistently rejected such counterclaims, and it would
be indeed unseemly for an officer of the court to use tactics designed to discourage people from
using the courts to adjudicate their grievances.").
226. Id. (noting that if an attorney loses a fee collection suit, it may be seen as an invitation
to bring a malpractice claim).
227. Id.
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counterclaim for fees may enhance the possibility of a settlement. Further,
since the malpractice suit will probably determine the issue of the attorney's
skill in representing the plaintiff, the defendant's right to collect fees will also
be determined. 2"
V. CONCLUSION

Legal malpractice cases may serve the laudable purposes of reinforcing
attorneys' resolve to provide good, competent legal services to their clients and
of policing the profession by meting out punishment and compensation for
injuries done to members of the public by members of the profession.
Unchecked by vigorous and effective defenses and advocacy on behalf of the
accused attorneys, however, legal malpractice cases have the potential to
impair the effectiveness of our judicial system by forcing attorneys to practice
in a defensive, reactive fashion rather than a more beneficial, proactive
manner.
Although it is by no means exhaustive, 9 this article has attempted to
summarize and survey some of the defenses and strategies available to
defendants in legal malpractice cases. The authors hope that it will prove
useful and helpful in the efforts by the bar to improve the quality of legal
services available to all clients, including that of our own colleagues in the
legal profession.

228. Id.
229. See e.g., Dave R. Bonelli, Annotation, In Personam Jurisdiction, Under Long-Arm
Statute, Over NonresidentAttorney in Legal MalpracticeAction, 23 A.L.R.4TH 1044, 1048-52
(1983 & Supp. 1993) (presenting cases in which the attorney was not subject to in personam
jurisdiction); Annotation, Abatement or Survival of Action for Attorney's Malpractice or
Negligence upon Death of Either Party, 65 A.L.R.2D 1211 (1959 & Supp. 1984, 1994)
(discussing the effect of an attorney's death on a malpractice action against the attorney).
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